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7720 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of Habeas Corpus for 
Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae, 
and Karen Taylor, 
Minors 
By LaPriel Taylor, 
Petitioner and Appellant 
vs. 
George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents 
and 
In the Matter of the Adoption of Howard 
Wayne Taylor, Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl 
Rae Taylor and Karen Taylor, 
Minors 
By George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents 
vs. 
LaPriel Taylor, 
Contestant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
CASE NO. 7720 
F I L E DL~E.-NELSON 
O C T 2 D 19 51 Attorney for defendants .. 
and respondents. 
c •e~ k, Supt eme Court, Gtan 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District 
of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of Habeas Corpus for 
Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae, 
and Karen Taylor, 
Minors 
By LaPriel Taylor, 
Petitioner and Appellant 
vs. 
George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents 
and 
In the Matter of the Adoption of Howard 
Wayne Taylor, Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl 
Rae Taylor and Karen Taylor, 
Minors 
By George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents 
vs. 
LaPriel Taylor, 
Contestant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants and respondents herein, are husband 
and wife, and they reside at 64 South 5th 'Vest Street, 
Logan, Utah. They were married on June 14, 1939. He 
is 54 years of age ( R. 117) and she is 37 years of age and 
both are in good health. They reside about B~ blocks from 
the 2nd Ward Church in Logan, and about 3}~ blocks from 
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a grade school. (R. 116). There is also located in Logan 
a junior high and senior high school, as well as the col-
lege. Respondents have no children of their own. ( R. 101). 
They became acquainted with the plaintiff, LaPriel 
Taylor, on June 1, 1949, when she came to their home to 
inquire if respondents would take three of her children, 
Wayne, Linda and Karen. Sheryl, plaintiff's fourth child 
and next to the youngest was then living in Elsinore, Utah, 
with plaintiff's relative. ( R. 27). At this time, Linda 
and Karen were in poor health. ( R. 102, 103). 
On June 2, 1949, respondents took Howard, Linda 
and Karren into their home, and plaintiff applied to the 
Welfare department at Logan, for their support. The 
plaintiff then departed for California to live with her hus-
band, ( R. 27) a_nd the respondents kept these children 
under this arrangement until about January 15, 1950. 
The plaintiff and husband, Howard Taylor, returned from 
California about October 1, 1949, and brought Sheryl 
Rae from Elsinore with them. They lived with plaintiff's 
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Page, at Nibley, about four miles 
south of Logan, for a portion of the time and a part of 
the time at Ogden. (R. 34). On January 15, 1950, plain-
tiff was forced to take the children off the relief rolls in 
Cache County, in order to relieve her husband from a 
conviction in the Juvenile Court, of Cache County, be-
cause of his failure to support them. ( R. 33). Plaintiff 
then took the children to Ogden, ( R. 104) and was on 
relief in Weber County from January 15, to March 9, 
1950. (R. 37). 
About February 15, 1950, defendants, while return-
ing from Salt Lake City, stopped at plaintiff's apartment 
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in Ogden to visit the children. ( R. 151 ) . The children 
were pleased to see the defendants, particulary Karen, 
the youngest. (R. 104, 105). The latter part of February, 
1950, defendants had occasion to visit the plaintiff's par-
ents, at Nibley, and Karen and Sheryl were there. They 
permitted defendants to take Karen to their home and 
she remained for a couple of days, and on March 1, 1950, 
it being her birthday, defendants took her to Ogden, 
( R. 105). When they arrived at plaintiff's apartment she 
asked defendants if they - "Wanted some children, she 
had some to give away," ( R. 106, 152). Plaintiff informed 
defendants that - "She had written to the Welfare in 
Salt Lake and she hadn't received any answer as to the 
placement of the children." ( R. 106). Defendants then 
informed plaintiff that if she intended to give the children 
away, the defendants wanted them, (R.106, 152). There-
upon plaintiff consented to give the children to the de-
fendants and told them to have a written adoption agree-
ment prepared and requested defendants to return to 
Ogden on March 9, 1950, when her husband Howard 
would be there to sign the agreement, ( R. 106, 152). 
The defendants returned to Ogden on March 9th with 
the adoption agreement, and plaintiff and her husband 
were at the apartment. On this occasion the defendants 
were accompanied by the plaintiff's parent, Mr. and Mrs. 
Page, and the children Sheryl and Karen. ( R. 106, 152). 
After their arrival defendants gave the adoption agree-
ment to plaintiff and she examined it, and personally 
retained possession thereof for an hour or more and until 
the plaintiff and her husband were ready to leave for the 
bus depot, and enroute thereto, they stopped at the notary 
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public's office. There plaintiff and her husband entered 
the office, and defendants remained in the car, (R. 107, 
154). Mter plaintiff and her husband had executed the 
adoption agreement they came out of the office and 
entered the defendants car and gave the agreement to 
:Mr. Waddoups, (R. 108, 153 ). He examined it and ob-
served their signatures thereon, and that it had been 
notarized, ( R. 108). Enroute from there to the bus 
station plaintiff said that- "She was pleased because she 
knew that the children would have a secured home, some-
thing to look forward to in their future lives, and that 
she didn't think she was making a mistake in doing so," 
( R. 108, 153). The defendants returned to the apartment, 
where lvlr. and Mrs. Page and the children were waiting, 
and the children were taken to defendants' home in Logan, 
where they have since resided with the defendants, 
(R. 109, 111). Defendant Waddoups identified the 
adoption agreement which he received from the plaintiff 
as defendant's Exhibit One. (R. 108, 109). 
On March 9, 1950, the plaintiff appeared to have 
normal health, about the same as she appeared to have 
at the time of the trial. ( R. 111). During the summer 
and fall of 1950, the plaintiff made three or four visits 
to the defendant's home, and on each occasion expressed 
satisfaction with the condition of the children, ( R. 112), 
and during the summer and fall of 1950, the plaintiff 
wrote five letters to the defendants, and in all of them 
she expressed satisfaction with the manner in which de-
fendants were taking care of the children, and also the 
home conditions and environment ( R. 51). The last 
letter was written on November 9, 1950, (R. 53), in which 
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she offered to execute a relinquishment for adoption of 
her expected child, which was born on November 29th, 
1950. 
The defendants own real property in Logan and 
Preston, Idaho, valued at $12,000.00, debt free. The 
defendants also have a bank account, which at the time 
of trial, was about $1200.00; an automobile and household 
furniture. The defendants have enjoyed and do now 
enjoy good health, and defendant Waddoups has steady 
employment. (R. 112, 113)·. 
The defendants have bestowed love and affection 
upon and, have taken the best of care of the children, 
(R. 1l2, 113, 144, 180-189), and have made corrections 
in their health conditions, and at the time of the trial, 
the children were healthy and in good physical and 
mental condition. The children are also living in a good 
wholesome environment, and will receive educational, 
religious, and moral training. (R. 116, 171-174). And 
the children love the defendants and show it by their 
reactions~ and they frequently tell the defendants that 
they love them. (R. 155, 169, 180, 181-189). 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. The findings, conclusions, and fudgment of 
the court, denying the plaintiff's writ of Habeas Corpus, 
(File, pages 30-37) and the findings, conclusions of law, 
and fudgment, granting the plaintiff's petition for adop-
tion, (File, pages 38-47) and the order of adoption, (File, 
page 48) are amply supported by defendant's Exhibit One, 
an irrevocable contract for adoption, as well as by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence adduced at the trial. 
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The said consent to adoption, "Exhibit One," executed 
by plaintiff~ LaPriel Taylor and Howard Taylor, natural 
parents of the children named therein, is in the usual form 
used in adoption proceedings and for the convenience 
of this court, said instrument is herewith set forth in its 
entirety: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Adoption of 
Howard Wayne Taylor, 
Lindsay Kay Taylor, 
Sheryl Rae Taylor, and 
Karen Taylor, 
Minors. 
CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION 
We, the undersigned, parents of the following named 
children, to-wit: 
Howard Wayne Taylor ______________ Age 9 years 
Linda Kay Taylor ------------------------ Age 7 years 
Sheryl Rae Taylor ------------------------ Age 2 years 
Karen Taylor ------------------------------ Age 1 year 
hereby consent that the above named children may be 
adopted by George Q. Waddoups and wife, Maria A. 
Waddoups, of Logan, Utah, as prayed for in the petition 
for adoption to be filed in the above entitled court and 
cause and in pursuance to the statutes in such cases made 
and provided. 
DATED this 9th day of March, A. D., 1950. 
HOWARD C. TAYLOR 
LAPRIEL PAGE TAYLOR. 
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STATE OF UTAH 1 
r ss. 
County of Weber J 
On this 9th day of March, A. D., 1950, personally 
appeared before me, Howard Taylor and LaPriel H. 
Taylor, the signers of the above and foregoing consent 
to adoption, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
understood the same and that the same was executed 
voluntarily and of their own free will and consent. 
RHEAH B. POULTER, 
Notary Public. 
Residing at: Ogden, Utah. 
My Commission Expires: January 17, 1954. 
The defendants relied upon said adoption agreement, 
and on March .9, 1950, they took the children into their 
home with the express intention of adopting them. (Tr. 
108, 191). The plaintiff was conversant with the intent 
of Exhibit One, because it is denominated as a "Consent 
to Adoption." It also mentioned the name of the court 
and cause, ·so plaintiff was put on notice that adoption 
proceedings were contemplated. "Exhibit One," also pro-
vides that the undersigned - "hereby consent that the 
above named children may be adopted by George Q. 
Waddoups and wife, Maria A. Waddoups of Logan, Utah, 
as prayed for in the petition for adoption to be filed in 
the above entitled court and cause." And in the ac-
knowlegement it expressly provides that the plaintiff and 
her husband acknowledged to the notary public "that 
they understood- "the consent for adoption- "and that 
the same was executed voluntarily and of their own free 
will and consent." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
It will thus be seen from the form and contents of 
"Exhibit One" that plaintiff was put on notice of the true 
intent, purpose, and finality of said contract for adoption. 
It will also be seen that there is no condition or qualifica-
tion expressed therein. She was definitely advised that 
adoption proceedings would follow in accordance with -
"the statutes in such cases made and provided." 
This court has had occasion to determine the legal 
effect to be given to a written relinquishment and consent 
for adoption and in each case this court has held that 
parents may by contract legally transfer and surrender 
their child or children into the custody of another person 
to be adopted by the latter, if the child is not prejudiced 
by the transaction. The cases so holding are: 
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 
Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah 373, 134 Pac. 898 
Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 183 Pac. 328 
Flora v. Flora, 84 Utah 143, 29 P 2d 498 
In the Stanford case this court had under considera-
tion a written consent for adoption, executed by the 
childs mother, the child having been forn out of wedlock. 
Subsequently thereto, the childs mother having married, 
brought action against Mr. and Mrs. Gray, with whom 
the said child had been placed for adoption. 
At the trial, the consent for adoption was offered and 
received in evidence, but the trial court held that the 
child's mother was not bound by said contract. On appeal 
to this court, the trial court was reversed. Construing 
the legal effect of a written contract for adoption, this 
court said: 
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"There are some authorities which hold that a contrat 
made by a parent in which he surrenders the care, 
control, and custody of his minor child to another is 
void as against public policy. The great weight of 
authority, however, sustains the position of appellants 
that a parent may by contract legally transfer and 
surender his infant child into the custody of another 
where the interest of the child is not prejudiced by 
the transaction." 
In Humel v. Parrish et. al. 43 Utah 373, 134 Pac. 898; 
the child was born to appellant out of wedlock, at Buda-
pest, Hungary, on February 13, 1903. When the child 
was about 14 months old appellant left the child with her 
mother, and about two years thereafter appellant's mother 
emigrated to the United States, bringing with her the 
child. Shortly thereafter the grandmother believing that 
her daughter was dead, signed a written relinquishment 
and consent for adoption of the child to Samuel J. and 
Caddie R. Parrish. Later the childs mother brought 
habeas corpus against Mr. and Mrs. Parrish, to obtain the 
custody of the child. The trial court denied plaintiffs 
writ, and she appealed to this court. 
In referring to the theory adopted by the trial court, 
this court said: · 
"It seems that the court, in rendering its decision 
denying the writ, proceeded upon the theiry; First, 
that the appellant had surrendered and delivered 
the child into the care and custody of its grand-
mother; and, second, that it would be for the best 
interest of the child for it to remain in the care and 
custody of the respondents." 
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In the course of the opinion in Humel v. Parrish, 
supra ,this court quoted what was thought to be the cor-
rect n1le laid down by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the 
case of Smidt Y. Benenga, 118 N. W. 440, in the following 
language: 
"Generally speaking, the natural parents are entitled 
to the care, custody, and control of their minor chil-
dren; but they may by agreement or conduct deprive 
thems~!ves of this natural right and confer it upon 
others. 
In Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 183 P. 328, 
this court announced the rule which we think is applicable 
to the facts in the instant case, and we quote from 55 
Utah, page 5: 
"It is true, everything else being equal, that the 
natural parent of a child is entitled to its care, custody, 
and control. This court, however, by its former de-
cisions, is committed to the more humane doctrine 
that in cases of this nature the natural parent may, 
by agreement or by conduct, deprive himself of his 
natural right and confer it upon others; that in cases 
where the parent has lost that right either by agree-
ment or conduct the guiding principle will always be 
the best interests of the child for the present and its 
future. Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah, 228, 129 Pac. 423 
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 989; Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah, 
373, 134 Pac. 898. 
In the case of Flora v. Flora, 29 P. 2d. 498, at page 
499, this court said: "Here the parents by written con-
sent surrendered the custody of the children to the re-
spondents." 
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The case of Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28, S.W. 
281 is cited and quoted in Stanford v. Gray, Supra. The 
following rule laid down by the Texas court is applicable 
to the facts in the instant case: We quote: 
"Where, however, a parent, by writing or otherwise, 
has voluntarily transferred and delivered his minor 
child into the custody and under the control of an-
other, as in the case at bar, and then seeks to recover 
possession of the child by writ of habeas corpus, such 
parent is invoking the exercise of the equitable dis-
cretion of the court to disrupt private domestic re-
lations which he has voluntarily brought about, and 
the court will not grant the relief, unless upon a hear-
ing of all the facts it is of the opinoin that the best 
interests of the child would be promoted thereby." 
In the case of Curtis v. Curtis, 5 Gray (Mass.) 537, 
also cited in the Stanford case, the court said: 
"And the courts are all of the opinion that, so far as 
the rights of the mother are concerned, she has re-
linquished them by this instrument which operates 
either as a contract or an estoppel - and it is im-
material which - to prevent her from now setting 
up her rights." 
The case of Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, appears 
to be the earliest case in this jurisdiction and the opinion 
deals exhaustively with the fundamental principles in-
volved. In the next case, Hummel v. Parrish, 43 Utah 
373, the principles laid down in Stanford v. Gray, were 
followed, and this court in the Hummel case said: 
"This doctrine was recognized and approved in the 
case of Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah, 228, 129 Pac. 423, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
recently decided by this court. In addition to the 
authorities there cited we invite attention to the fol-
lowing cases in which the principle was adhered to 
and followed: In Re. Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 
N.W. 876; Jones v. Darnall, 103 Ind. 569, 2 N.E. 229, 
53 Am. Rep. 545; United States v. Green, 3 Mason, 
482, Fed. Cas. No. 15,256; Schneider v. Schwabe 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 143 S.W. 265, Stringfellow v. Som-
erville, 95 Va. 701, 29 S.E. 685, 40 L.R.A. 623; Kelsey 
v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 27 Atl. 679, L.R.A. 471; 
Sturtevant v. State, 15 Neb. 459, 19 N.W. 617, 48 
Am. Rep. 349; Fields v. Deming, 56 Wash. 259, 105 
Pac. 466." 
In the third case of Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, 
the principles announced in the Stanford case and re-
stated in the Hummel case, were reiterated again. 
And in the latest case to be decided by this court, 
involving a written consent for adoption is Flora v. Flora, 
84 Utah 143, 29 P 2d. 498, and it was declared in the 
opinion that - "Here the parents, by written consent, sur-
rendered the custody of the children to the respondent 
A. B. Flora." And the Stanford, Hummel and Christensen 
cases herein reviewed were cited. And from the decis-
ions in these cases it will be seen that the legal effect 
of a written consent for adoption, which is followed by 
a petition and order of adoption, casts the burden on the 
natural parent - "To show that the children are not re-
ceiving proper physical, moral, and intellectual training." 
The facts in the following Utah cases are clearly dis-
tinguishable from the facts in the case at bar. 
Harrison v. Harker 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716. 
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Jones v. Moore 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191. 
Jensen v. Early 63 Utah 604, 228 P. 217. 
Sherry v. Doyle 68 Utah 250, 249 P. 250. 
Walton v. Coffman 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d. 97. 
Baldwin v. Nielsen 110 Utah 172, 172, 170 P. 2d. 179. 
Hardcastle v. Hardcastle 221 P. 2d. 883. 
In none of the foregoing cases had the parent relin-
quished his or her rights to the child, by a written consent 
for adoption. And in most, if not all of those cases, the 
parent had parted with the custody of child, either be-
cause of illegitimacy, or leaving the child for board and 
lodging, or leaving the child with its grandparents or other 
relatives. And in some of these cases the parents had later 
entered into marriage, resulting in an improved condition, 
whereby the child could be returned to its natural parent, 
or parents, thus resulting in re-union of parents and child. 
And in one or more of the cases, the child was returned 
to the natural mother because of absence of a written 
consent; and where it was also shown that the parent had 
not abandoned the child. 
The appellant first assigns error, (Point 1) contend-
ing that the consent for adoption was not executed in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 14-4-8. It seems 
to be appellant's contention that· notwithstanding she and 
her husband executed the consent for adoption to meet 
the requirements of Section 14-4-4, it is also imperative 
that an additional consent be executed under Section 
14-4-8, at the time of the hearing for adoption, where 
their written consent to adoption is again necessary and 
must be signed in the presence of the court. 
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This contention was rejected by the trial court, in 
Yiew of the fact that the appellant had previously, to-wit, 
on ~larch 9, 1950, executed a written consent for adoption. 
And for the further reason that the adoption order of 
January 8, 1951, was vacated and the plaintiff was given 
a hearing on the merits, where she was permitted to offer 
evidence in opposition to the petition for adoption. 
Under appellants contention it would be necessary 
for a natural parent, who has executed a written consent 
for adoption, to meet the requirements of Section 14-4-4, 
to again appear in court when the petition for adoption 
is heard and sign another consent under Section 14-4-8. 
This would seem to be a strained interpretation to 
place upon Sections 14-4-4, and 14-4-8. Section 14-4-4, 
provides that - "A legitimate child cannot be adopted 
without the consent of its parents, if living." The con-
verse of that provision is - that a legitimate child can be 
adopted by another if the parent's consent to the adoption 
is procured. 
Thus, as in the case at bar, the parents having exe-
cuted a written consent under oath, the provision of 
Section 14-4-4, is legally complied with. If so, why should 
it be necessary for the parents to appear in court at tht1 
hearing to be held at least one year later, and sign a second 
consent. Section 14-4-4, does not so provide. This would 
be very impractical, as well as absurd, and in most cases 
impossible of performance. 
Section 14-4-4 provides four methods to affect the 
adoption of children. 
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1. Consent of parents to adoption of legitimate child. 
2. Consent of mother to adoption of illegimate child. 
3. Consent of parents not necessary where they have 
been judicially deprived of the custody of children on 
account of cruelty, neglect or desertion. 
4. Where a parent or parents place the child with 
a child placing agency, and give such agency a written 
release of their control and custody of such child; and 
such agency subsequently executes a consent in writing 
to the adoptive parents in whose home such child has 
been placed for adoption. 
When Sections 14-4-4 and 14-4-8, are carefully ex-
amined it would appear that the latter section has no 
application to adoption hearings petitioned under para-
graphs one, two, and three of Section 14-4-4. 
It is) however, the practice under sub-paragraph four, 
of Section 14-4-4, for an agent of a child placing agency 
to appear in court and give the agency's consent for adop-
tion at the time of the adoption hearing, and this is no 
doubt what is intended by the language used in Section 
14-4-8, where it provides that, the other person whose 
consent is necessary, must appear before the district court 
of the county where the person adopting resides and the 
necessary consent must thereupon be signed." When this 
language is read in connection with the last provision 
of Section 14-4-4, it will be seen tha~ they harmonize. Ap-
pellants counsel has failed to cite a Utah case supporting 
their contention under point 1. 
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In 1 Am. Jur. 641, the rule is stated that notice of 
the petition is not necessary "where written consent there-
to has been filed with the court." If notice of the hearing 
is not necessary a Fortiori the natural parents presence 
in court is not necessary. 
The appellant next assigns error, (Point 2) that the 
trial court erred in finding that the consent of adoption as 
signed by the plaintiff was irrevocable. It was held in 
Stanford v. Gray, supra, that, - "So far as the rights of 
the mother is concerned, she has relinquished them by 
this instnrment, which operates either as a conract or an 
estoppel - and it is immaterial which - to prevent her 
from setting up her rights." 
And in Flora v. Flora, 29 P. 2d, 498, at page 499, this 
court said: "Here the parents by written consent surrend-
ered the custody of the children to the respondents." 
It would also appear that the consent to adoption in 
the instant case is irrevocable, under the rule adhered to 
by this court in the Stanford, Hummel, Christensen and 
Flora cases. The rule as stated in the Stanford case, on 
pages 242 of 42 Utah, is: 
"What we do hold is that, Mrs. Hansen having vol-
untarily relinquished and surrendered her right to 
the care and custody of the child, the burden is on 
her to show that the parties who acquired the custody 
of the child by virtue and in pursuance of tJ:le relin-
quishment have in some way been derelict in their 
duty to the child, and that it would be better for the 
best interests of the child to take it out of their cust-
ody a?,d return it to her. This she has wholly failed 
to do. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Plaintiff contends that the children were taken with 
the understanding that they would be returned if plain-
tiff's health improved. This was refuted by defendants 
since they testified that they took the children in pur-
suance to the written consent for adoption and relied upon 
it. And moreover the consent for adoption, "Exhibit One" 
contains no provision to that effect. Nor is there any such 
contention made in plaintiff's letters, (R. 51-53) and the 
last one was written on November 8, 1950, eight months 
after plaintiff relinquished her parental rights to the 
children. 
Appellant next assigns error (Point 3) that the court 
erred in finding in the adoption proceedings that the 
plaintiff had abandoned her children for the reason that 
there were no allegations in the petition for adoption that 
the children had been abandoned by the plaintiff, etc. 
The petition for adoption in the instant care was of 
course predicated upon the written consent for adoption, 
and that was sufficient for adoption purposes under the 
sta~ute. However, in the various petitions filed by the 
appellant, (File, pages 7-8, 11-15) there are allegations 
that she was justified in signing the consent for adoption 
because of her ill health, and in the answer to the affidavit 
of appellant by the respondents (File, pages 23-27) it is 
alleged among other things that, "since the birth of Sheryl 
Rae and Karen Taylor, the affiant had lived very little, if 
any, with said children. That although plaintiff could 
have made a home for the children during the aforesaid 
period of time, she has preferred to seek employment and 
live separate and apart from them, thus satisfying her own 
selfish interests to the detriment of her children." 
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It will appear that the issue of abandonment was 
thus created by the pleadings and there is evidence in the 
record that for a number of years the plaintiff has lived 
away from the children, leaving them with her parents 
and later with the defeJ?.dants, and that plaintiff has been 
more concerned about her personal pleasure and welfare 
than she has for the welfare of her children. This was 
evidenced when plaintiff left the children with defendants 
on June 2, 1949, and departed for the state of California, 
on the pretext that she was going to be reconciled with 
her husband, when as a matter of fact she actually went to 
California to be with her husband and enjoy his company 
without being burdened with the children. This is further 
evidenced by the fact that she did not return until about 
October 1, 1949, and although she returned with her hus-
band to the home of her parents at Nibley, they did not 
then provide for these children, but permitted them to 
remain with the respondents. And for the next 2~~ months 
she and her husband lived a portion of the time with her 
parents and the other portion in Ogden, while the children 
remained with the respondents. 
And it is doubtful that the plaintiff would have taken 
the children from the defendants custody on January 15, 
1950, had it not been for the fact that the Department of 
Public Welfare of Cache County had preferred a com-
plaint against Howard Taylor, the father of these children 
for neglect and non-support, and in order to relieve him 
of a conviction in the Juvenile Court, plaintiff removed 
these children to Ogden. But between January 15th and 
March 9, 1950, or for a period of less than 2 months, the 
two younger children, Sheryl and Karen, spent a consid-
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erable portion of that time at Nibley with their grand-
parents. And except for the fact that the two older chil-
dren, Wayne and Linda, were in school at Ogden, they 
would likely have also been living for a portion of this time 
with their grandparents at Nibley. 
It would thus seem that there was an issue created 
on the question of abandment, and although the plaintiff 
was bound and controlled by defendant's Exhibit One, 
the consent agreement for adoption, the court also had 
a right to make a finding on the question of abandonment, 
in view of the plaintiff's neglect and absence from the 
children for considerable periods of time as shown by 
the pleadings and evidence. 
Point 2. The plaintiff and appellant having by agree-
ment (Exhibit One), relinquished her natural right to 
to the children, she is not entitled to regain their custody 
and control, unless she can establish that the children are 
being neglected and mistreated by the defendants. 
The foregoing rule was laid down in the case of 
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah at page 242, and as it was 
applied in that case against the mother of the child, where 
the court stated the rule in the following language: 
"What we do hold is that, Mrs. Hansen having vol-
untarily relinquished and surrendered her right to 
the care and custody of the child, the burden is on 
her to show that the parties who acquired the custody 
of the child by virtue and in pursuance of the re-
linquishment have in some way been derelict in their 
duty to the child, and that it would be better for the 
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best interests of the child to take it out of their 
custody and return it to her. This she has wholly 
failed to do." 
The foregoing ntle was re-affirmed and applied 
against the parent in the later cases of Humel v. Parrish, 
43 Utah 373, Farmer v. Christensen, 55 Utah 1, and Flora 
v. Flora, 84 Utah 143, that when the natural parent has 
relinquished his right to the control and custody of the 
children, in order to regain their custody and control 
which he has lost, he must show that the child is being 
neglected and mistreated by the adopting parents. The 
trial court, found at the conclusion of the trial in the 
instant case, that the appellant had relinquished her right 
to the custody and control of all four children by virtue 
of defandants Exhibit One, but owing to the fact that 
Wayne was ten years of age and had elected to return to 
the appellant, the court granted the writ of Habeas Corpus 
as to him, but denied the writ as to Linda, Sheryl and 
Karen. The court also granted the petition for adoption 
in the case of Linda, Sheryl and Karen, and denied it with-
out prejudice as to Wayne because of his election. Thus 
the court held that the plaintiff relinquished her rights 
to the custody and control of Linda, Sheryl, and Karen, 
because of her execution and delivery of the written con-
sent for their adoption. It was therefore necessary for 
the plaintiff to establish, which she failed to do at the 
trial, that Linda, Sheryl and Karen were being neglected 
and mistreated by the defendants. 
The appellant not only failed to prove that the child-
ren were being neglected but the evidence shows that the 
interest, welfare and happiness of the children has been 
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improved during the time that they have lived with the 
defendants, from March 9, 1950, to the time of the trial 
on May 14, 1951, or for a period of 14 months. -
The witnesses Henry R. Cooper, school principal at 
Woodruff school which Linda and Wayne attended (R. 
171-173), and Lela Nelson ( R. 168, 187, 188, 189), Ella 
C. Spillman ( R. 181, 183), and Blanch Smith ( R. 183-
185), and Jess Bouwuis (R. 176, 181, 188, 189), all testi-
fied that they were acquainted with the defendants, had 
frequently visited their home and, that they had observed 
the conditions of the children, both in the home, in s'chool, 
and in public. Their testimony is proof of the splendid 
manner in which the defendants were taking care of these 
children, making a good home for them and being good, 
faithful, devoted and loving parents. The children are 
living in a modern home, and have access to religious, and 
educational advantages, and that the children's future 
security, and moral welfare will be promoted by remain-
ing with the defendants. The above witnesses testified 
that they had observed mutual love and affection exhib-
ited by the children towards the defendants and by the 
defendants towards the children, and that Mrs. Waddoups 
was invariably at home taking care of the children when 
the witnesses called to visit them. 
The children have lived with the defendants from 
June 2, 1949 to the present time, or for a period of approx-
imately 28 months, with an interruption of about 7 weeks, 
from January 15 to March 9, 1950, and during which time 
the children have enjoyed all the advantages that could 
come to children by devoted and loving parents, and that 
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may be contrasted with the treatment the children were 
receiving when under the control of the plaintiff when 
they were moved around from one place to another. 
And consider further the fact that the children· would 
return to a strange mother and step-father. The advant-
ages pointed to by :Mr. Justice Latimer, in the majority 
opinion of this court in Hardcastle v. Hardcastle, 221 P. 
2d. 883, are all in favor of the children in the case at bar, 
provided they are permitted to remain with defendants. 
And moreover, as the trial court found, the appellant now 
has two of her children and will likely give birth to others. 
\Vhat is herein stated under defendants point 2, also 
sufficently answers appellant's point 4 and 5. The cases 
therein relied on viz, Jones v. Moore, 213 P. 191, Baldwin 
v. Nielson 170 P. 2d. 179, and Hardcastle v. Hardcastle, 
221 P. 2d. 883, are not in point. In none of those cases 
did the parent execute a written consent for adoption. And 
in all of those cases this court held that the natural parent 
had not abandoned the child. However~ in the Hardcastle 
case, the question involving where the best interests of 
the child would be promoted was very close, and by a 
three to two decision~ the mother was awarded the cutody 
of the child. But as hereinbefore stated the advantages 
claimed for the child in the majority opinion in the Hard-
castle case, by being awarded to the 1nother, argue in 
favor of the children remaining with respondents in the 
instant case. 
At the trial defendants counsel asked plaintiff -
"You would have the court understand that from March 
9th, up to the 29th of November, ( 1950) you had always 
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felt it was for the best interests of the children to be 
adopted by the Waddoups?" ( R. 50). Plaintiff said "No" 
and testified that she changed her mind in July 1950. 
( R. 50). Evidently, plaintiff had forgotten the letters she 
wrote to defendants before and subsequent to July 1950. 
On May 10, 1950, two months after plaintiff executed 
the written consent for adoption and relinquished her 
parental rights to the custody and control of the children, 
she wrote a letter to the defendants in which she stated -
''I'm satisfied that the best thing for the babies has been 
done and am grateful that people as yourselves will have 
the blessings and reward of this life and eternal in watch-
ing the development of these little souls into useful 
citizens." ( R. 51). 
On October 2, 1950, about three months after plain-
tiff is supposed to have changed her mind, she wrote to 
the defendants and greeted them as "Dearest George and 
~,faria," and in the course of the letter she said: "I don't 
want to shake their security. It means peace of mind and 
contentment to me." Then she refers to her unborn child 
which she expected in November 1950, and continued as 
follows: "Being full brothers and sisters, they should be 
together, having what you afford them, the hopes, ad-
vantages, environment that I could not give as natural 
parent." ( R. 52). 
On October 25th, plaintiff wrote a third letter to 
defendants and greets them as, "Dearest Maria and 
George." "I am fine and in better condition than I was 
prior to last week. Time is close. Any day I had thought 
about the paper (Consent for adoption of unborn baby) 
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to be drawn up before the child is born. Howard will 
haYe to send it when he comes to the hospital. I am to 
telegraph him when it happens. His consent and signa~ 
ture to both adoption and operation permit is mandatory. 
So I will call yon from the hospital and tell you the details 
of when to come for the baby." ( R. 52, 53). 
The foregoing letter was followed by another letter, 
dated November 6, from plaintiff to defendants: "Dear 
:\!aria and George; I have a mixture of feelings, but I'll 
keep you informed, at any rate. Did you see about the 
paper? (consent for adoption). Howard came and went 
back but will return at the time, as it is mandatory that 
he sign paper too." ( R. 53). 
Two days later, on November 8, "Dear Maria and 
George: "You write and tell me, I will have the baby 
within eight days now, so we should be satisfied as what 
was done before and would be now." Then the letter 
goes on to arrange for delivery of the baby to the de-
fendants at Beth's place. And she requested defendants 
to, "Bring the paper and Howard and myself can sign. 
I don't know how else it can be arranged." ( R. 53). 
The foregoing letters are important as they portray 
the true feelings of the plaintiff. They also definitely 
prove that plaintiff was continuously from March 9, 
1950, to November 8, 1950, or for a period of eight months, 
highly pleased and contented because she had relin-
quished the children named in defendant's Exhibit One, 
to defendants for adoption. She was high in her praise 
of the care, nurture, advantages and environment the 
children were receiving and enjoying in the defendants 
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home - and plaintiff wanted her unborn baby to have 
the same care, nuture, advantage, and environment by 
being adopted by the defendants. 
Yet after expressing herself as aforesaid, in about one 
month thereafter, she decided to take legal action against 
the very people whom she had so recently praised. And, 
either forgetting the letters, or believing that the defend-
ants had destroyed them, plaintiff wanted the court to 
believe that she had changed her mind as early as July 
1950. (R. 50). 
Plaintiff offered in evidence "Exhibit A," copy of 
divorce decree entered in the Third District Court, on 
December 13, 1950, in which action she procured a di-
vorce from her husband Howard Taylor. The court found 
(File, page 44) that the award of the children Linda, 
Sheryl and Karen to plaintiff in the divorce action, was 
not binding upon these defendants, because they were 
not parties to, nor aware of said action. 
Attention is directed to the court's Exhibit A, the 
report from the Department of Public Welfare. From said 
report it will be seen that plaintiff has shown more interest 
for her own welfare than for her children. This conclusion 
is also supported by the record in this case. The Depart-
ment of Public Welfare also expressed the opinion that 
the best interests of the children will be subserved by 
remaining with the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff had a fair trial on the merits in this case, 
and the court had the opportunity to observe the appear-
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ance of the plaintiff and defendants, and also had an 
opportunity to observe the appearance of the children 
and their condition with respect to their welfare. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court indicated 
that the plaintiff had relinquished her rights to the child-
ren by reason of having executed the written consent for 
adoption, and viewed the case as being a proceeding of an 
equitable nature, and that the controlling principle must 
be the best interests of the children. This view fully 
accords with the views expressed by this court on num-
erous occasions. 
Considering the fact that the plaintiff had relin-
quished her right to the children and that the defendants 
relied thereon, and in good faith took the children into 
their custody, and have given these children the best pos-
sible care, and nuture, and will be able to afford them 
with educational, intellectual and moral training. It is 
respectfully submitted that the findings, conclusions and 
judgment of the court and the order of adoption made 
and entered by this court on June 18th and 19th, be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
L. E. NELSON 
Attorney for defendants 
and respondents. 
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